Dec 01, · Some important readings that delve, extensively, into these areas are Byrne & Hilbert Introduction, Shoemaker [], Chalmers Colors as We Ordinarily Talk and Think About Them. Before proceeding, there is an important point to clarify Avram Noam Chomsky (born December 7, ) is an American linguist, philosopher, cognitive scientist, historian, social critic, and political blogger.commes called "the father of modern linguistics", Chomsky is also a major figure in analytic philosophy and one of the founders of the field of cognitive science. He is Laureate Professor of Linguistics at the University of Arizona and Table of ContentsABSTRACT 21 Virtual Reality - Foundations Introduction - Now is the Time Essential Concepts Immersion and Presence 82 Science, Education and Training Psychology and Neuroscience The Virtual Body Changing the Body Can Change the Self Spatial Representation and Navigation Scientific and Data Visualization Education
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The idea of representation has been central in discussions of intentionality for many years. But only more recently has it begun playing a wider role in the philosophy of mind, chalmers master thesis opponent, particularly in theories of consciousness, chalmers master thesis opponent.
More cautiously, each theory attempts to explain its target phenomenon in terms of intentionalityand assumes that intentionality is representation. Like public, social cases of representation such as writing or mapmaking, intentional states such as beliefs have truth-value; they entail or imply other beliefs; they are it seems composed of concepts and depend for chalmers master thesis opponent truth on a match between their internal structures and the way the world is; and so it is natural to regard their aboutness as a matter of mental referring or designation.
Sellarsand Fodor argue that intentional states are states of a subject that have semantical properties, and the existent-or-nonexistent states of affairs that are their objects are just representational contents, chalmers master thesis opponent. So much is familiar and not very controversial. But problems of consciousness are generally felt chalmers master thesis opponent be less tractable than matters of intentionality.
The aim of a representationalist theory of consciousness is to extend the treatment of intentionality to that of consciousness, showing that if intentionality is well understood in representational terms, then so can be the phenomena of consciousness in whichever sense of that fraught term.
For each of the four foregoing notions of consciousness, some philosophers have claimed that that type of consciousness is entirely or largely explicable as a kind of representing. This entry will deal mainly with representational theories of consciousness in senses 3 and 4. For discussion of those, see the entry on higher-order theories of consciousness. In recent philosophy of mind that term has been used in a number of confusingly different ways.
There is a specific, fairly strict sense that comes to us from C. In particular, qualia may be properties of the experiences in which they inhere, or they may be related to those experiences in some other way. To avoid further confusion, chalmers master thesis opponent, let us speak of sensory qualities. A sensory quality can be thought of as the distinctive property of an apparent phenomenal individual. But it is important to see that qualities of this kind do not presuppose the existence of sense-data or other exotica.
Sensory fields are chalmers master thesis opponent by such qualities both in everyday veridical experience and in less usual cases.
Sensory qualities pose a serious problem for materialist theories of the mind. For where, ontologically speaking, are they located? Suppose Bertie is experiencing a green after-image as a result of seeing a red flash bulb go off; the greenness of the after-image is the quale.
Actual Russellian sense-data are immaterial individuals; so the materialist cannot admit that the greenness of the after-image is a property of an actual sense-datum. Nor is it plausible to suggest that the greenness is exemplified by anything physical in the brain if there is some green physical thing in your brain, you are probably in big trouble. To sharpen the problem:.
The modern representational theory of sensory qualities originates with HallAnscombe and Hintikka ; early adherents include KrautLewisLycan, HarmanShoemakerTye, aDretskeClarkByrneCrane, and Thau The representational theory is usually though not always an attempt to resolve the foregoing dilemma compatibly with materialism. According to the theory, sensory qualities are actually intentional contents, represented properties of represented objects. Suppose Ludwig is seeing a real tomato in good light, and naturally it looks red to him; there is a corresponding red patch in his visual field.
George Edward too is representing the redness of an external, physical tomato. It is just that in his case the tomato is not real; it and its redness are nonactual intentional contents.
But the redness is still the redness of the illusory tomato. Since in reality there is no green blob in the room with Bertie, his visual experience is unveridical; after-images are illusions.
The sensory quality, the greenness of the blob, is like the blob itself a nonactual intentional content. Of course, in cases of veridical perception, the color and the colored object are not merely intentional contents, because they actually exist, chalmers master thesis opponent, but they are still intentional objects, representata. And that is how the representationalist resolves our dilemma. As P1 has it, there is a green thing that Bertie is experiencing, but it is not an actual thing.
Thus, P5, understood as delivering an actual green entity, does not follow, chalmers master thesis opponent. The relevant properties of the experiences are, representing this quality or that. Of course, some psychosemantics would be needed to explain what it is in virtue of which a brain item represents greenness in particular.
The representation must be specifically a visual representation, produced by either a normal human visual system or by something functionally like one. Similar points would be made for nonvisual qualities, such as subjective bitterness, which would require alluding to the gustatory system.
Thus, the representational theory of sensory qualities cannot be purely representational, but must appeal to some further factor, to distinguish visual representations from other sorts of representations of redness. Lycan appeals to functional role. Pure representationalism would be the view that representation alone suffices for a sensory quality. But no one holds that view, for the reason just given: representation alone is cheap and ubiquitous.
Lloyd and Thau perhaps come close; Thau suggests that representing a certain special sort of content does suffice for a sensory quality. Weak representationalism has been fairly uncontroversial though it would have been denied by Russell, chalmers master thesis opponent, who showed no sign of thinking that his sense-data represented anything, and by behaviorists and Wittgensteinians who are hostile to the whole idea of mental representation.
At the very least, one who rejects it must try to explain why we distinguish between veridical and unveridical experiences; but more recently new opponents such as CampbellTravisNoëBrewerand Fish have attempted just that.
Also, we shall consider strong representationalism as applying to all sensory states, including bodily sensations as well as visual and other perceptions. Weak representationalism is somewhat controversial for pains, itches and other sensations, since it is not obvious that such sensations represent anything at all.
Accordingly, strong representationalism will be all the less defensible for them. There are further issues that divide strong representationalists, generating different versions of the view. Dretske and Tye maintain that they do; Lycan and others argue that they do not.
Since according to the representational theory, sensory qualities themselves are real or unreal environmental properties, the theory suggests that the qualities too are wide, and molecularly identical subjects could experience different qualities.
ShoemakerHorganKriegel bLevine and Chalmers defend narrow representationalism. Chalmers master thesis opponent some arguments on each side, see Section 4. Chalmers master thesis opponent wide representationalism or within narrow, there may be disagreement about what kinds of properties are represented.
In the previous section, it was assumed that the putative representata are environmental features such as the colors of physical objects, chalmers master thesis opponent.
But others have been suggested ByrneLevine : e. Shoemaker defends the view that a color experience represents a dispositional property, viz. On one interpretation at least, Thau posits a special sort of quasi-color property, distinct from but related to actual colors.
Notice that even on the straightforward view that the representata are the ostensible colors of physical objects, the representational theory does not presuppose color realism. There can be more general issues, in other sense modalities, of identifying the relevant worldly representata. Chalmers calls attention to the distinction between Russellian contents and Fregean contents.
The former can be a singular proposition or a configuration of objects and their properties. Though the proposition may be believed etc. under a mode of presentation, the mode of presentation is not part of the content itself. By contrast, a Fregean content includes the mode of presentation, and does not include individual objects themselves.
Representationalists have most often thought in Russellian terms about perceptual contents, but Chalmers argues that the content of a perceptual experience is Fregean. Because it neglects the objects themselves, the Fregean option would lend itself to a narrow representationalist account, if such is wanted; also, it helps to accommodate inversion examples Section 4. Chalmers master thesis opponent Crane and Chalmers have pointed out, representationalism need not be chalmers master thesis opponent. One might agree with the strong representationalist that sensory qualities are identical with intentional contents, but also contend that the latter intentional content properties cannot be characterized without reference to sensory qualities, so despite the identity there cannot be reduction without circularity.
Representationalists who sympathize with the view of, e. But many other representationalists are motivated by materialism and by the desire to reduce sensory qualities to intentionality, holding that intentionality is the more materialistically tractable of the two. Many representationalists hold that the theory not only preserves materialism while accommodating sensory qualities, but is the only very promising way of doing so.
For the only viable alternative resolution of our Bertie dilemma seems to be belief in actual Russellian sense-data or at least in immaterial properties. More likely, chalmers master thesis opponent, an opponent will hold the line at property dualism, as do Jackson and Chalmers That chalmers master thesis opponent quite bad enough for the materialist, but of course one who holds no brief for materialism in the first place will not be convinced by the present argument.
There are still nonrepresentationalist alternatives. Rather, Bertie senses green lygreenly-sensing being just a type of visual sensing. But as was not often noticedadverbialism is a semantical thesis about the logical forms of sensation statements, and as such it has been severely and tellingly criticized, e. Eliminativism about sensory qualities is chalmers master thesis opponent if not championed by Dennett and by Rey Levine discusses eliminativism at more length.
Dretske maintains that there is nothing intrinsic to the brain that constitutes the difference between a red quality and a green one. Unless there are Russellian sense-data or at least immaterial properties, what distinguishes the two qualities must be relational, and the only obvious candidate is, representing red or green. But as before, if one has no objection to sense-data or immaterial properties, one will be unmoved.
The neurophysiological type-identity theorist would protest here too, though the same rejoinders apply. A less commissive objection is that, contra Dretske, there are candidate relations besides that of representing: some wide functional relation, perhaps, or a typical-cause relation where neither of these is itself taken to constitute representing.
We distinguish between veridical and nonveridical visual experiences. How so? That is hard to dispute. But one will then have to give an oblique account of the notion of chalmers master thesis opponent. If one joins Campbell et al.
in rejecting perceptual representation entirely, chalmers master thesis opponent, one will still have to reconstruct veridicality in some ad hoc way. Once the greenness has already been accounted for, what qualitative content is left? For example, Block maintains that Bertie could introspect a certain qualitative property in addition to the greenness of the after-image.
And we shall definitely encounter a further kind of content in Section 4. Tye and Crane extend this argument to bodily sensations such as pain. The transparency argument can be extended also to the purely hallucinatory case.
Thesis Defense
, time: 21:34Representational Theories of Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Dec 01, · Some important readings that delve, extensively, into these areas are Byrne & Hilbert Introduction, Shoemaker [], Chalmers Colors as We Ordinarily Talk and Think About Them. Before proceeding, there is an important point to clarify Law is a system of rules created and enforced through social or governmental institutions to regulate behavior, with its precise definition a matter of longstanding debate. It has been variously described as a science and the art of justice. State-enforced laws can be made by a group legislature or by a single legislator, resulting in statutes; by the executive through decrees and regulations May 22, · Chalmers offers a “Master Argument” meant to refute any version of the strategy: it is a dilemma based on whether it is conceivable that the complete fundamental physical truth holds yet we possess no phenomenal concepts (having whichever features). The argument is criticized by Papineau (), Carruthers and Veillet (), and Balog ()
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